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And so although I was to begin filled with the desire for political action,
when I observed this state of affairs and saw the general confusion, I at
last felt dizzy from it all. I did not, it is true, cease to think how these
conditions themselves and the whole of the government of the state
could be improved, but I waited for a suitable occasion for action of my
own. In the end I became convinced that all current states have a bad
government, because their lawgiving is incorrigible if there is no
uncommon exploit aided by fortune.
(Plato, Seventh Epistle/Letter)
ABSTRACT
This paper analyses the quality of governance and public admin-
istration as key determinants for successful functioning within the
European Union (EU). A comparison between Croatia and future and
present EU members is made, according to separate governance indica-
tors (rule of law, democracy, corruption, political stability, government
effectiveness) and experience in reform of the public administration.
The paper shows that Croatia by all quality of governance indicators,
particularly with respect to the rule of law, lags considerably behind the
EU and the Central Europe candidate countries. The low level of the
rule of law in combination with an inadequate public administration is
potentially the greatest obstacle in Croatia’s accession to the EU as well
as in the creation of sustainable economic and social development.
Key words:
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INTRODUCTION 
Since all countries, including those in the EU, have as their
objectives a standard of living that is as high as possible, it is under-
standable why increased attention is directed towards governance. In
the last dozen years there has been growing awareness that good gov-
ernance is the key determinant of the ability to attain sustainable eco-
nomic and social development. There is ever more evidence that for
development it is not enough just to hit upon the appropriate policy, but
it is also necessary to have a good institutional structure. A good insti-
tutional structure implies the existence of an environment that enables
effective implementation of a given policy and that encourages individ-
uals to invest in capital, education and technology – the factors behind
economic growth.
Governance refers primarily to government, and one of the pil-
lars of government is the public administration. It has been shown that
it has been precisely this that has been one of the main barriers to suc-
cessful transition to a democratic society and a market economy. Its
transformation and modernisation in line with the principles of good
governance are becoming particularly important in the context of
European integration because strong administrative capacities are nec-
essary for the whole of the process to be successfully concluded.
At the beginning of the paper there is an explanation of the con-
cept of governance and its connection with public administration. After
citation of those conditions for EU membership that are related to the
subject of the paper, the quality of governance and public administra-
tion in Croatia is described and a comparison with the EU average, with
selected candidate countries and the less developed countries of the EU
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is given. The quality of governance is assessed according to the follow-
ing indicators: rule of law, development of democracy, spread of cor-
ruption, political stability and effectiveness of government. The paper
briefly describes the experience of some European countries in the
reform of the public administration. At the very end a summary of the
key problems of governance and public administration in Croatia on the
road to the EU is offered and some concrete recommendations for their
solution are provided.
GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
It is quite difficult to reply to the simple question: what exactly
is governance? There is no consensus about a definition, although all
start out from the idea that it is about something that has a complex his-
torical, political and social/cultural background, and hence requires an
interdisciplinary approach. The narrowest definition is: the science
about government and its performance (Dethier 1999:5). The World
Bank, which was the first to give prominence to the role of governance,i
describes it as the manner in which authority is exercised in the man-
agement of country’s economic and social resources for development
(World Bank, 1992:1). It might be characterised as the capacity of the
formal and informal institutional environment (in which individuals,
social groups, civil associations and government officials and employ-
ees interact) to apply and carry through a given government policy and
to improve coordination in the private sector (Ahrens, 2002:128). Thus
the key words are institutions and government, and the questions that
dominate are how, and how well.ii From these sentences one can see
that there is no totally adequate translation for this concept in Croatian
publications, although there have been some attempts.iii
All these definitions rely on a single empirical fact: identical
reform measures that governments undertake have different results in
different countries. It seems extremely likely that the different quality
of the governance involved is very largely responsible for this. In other
words, countries with better governance should be able to achieve their
development aims more easily and effectively. Research has pointed
out that such countries do indeed have a higher per capita income and
better other indicators of development.iv
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Government consists of three pillars: the economic, political and
administrative pillar (UNDP, 1997). The economic refers to the process
of making decisions that affect the economic activities of the country
and its relations with other countries. The political pillar is the process
of forming policy according to decisions that have been made, and the
administrative relates to the implementation of this policy. This admin-
istrative pillar is embodied in the public administration. Governance
describes how authority is exercised, and the public administration pos-
sesses part of this authority. Accordingly, an evaluation of governance,
as good or bad, depends to an extent on the successfulness of the work
of the public administration.
The next question follows logically. How do we know whether
governance is good, that is, how can it be identified or recognised? And
what anyway are the criteria in general for defining something as good
and how can it be measured?
The elements through which the use of authority in the process
of the management of resources for development, which is actually
governance, are: political stability, effectiveness of the government,
rule of law, development of democracy, spread of corruption, the mag-
nitude of administrative obstacles, and others. Those countries that
have these elements formed in such a way as to promote development
can be said to have good governance.
Naturally, the government does not work in a vacuum: the suc-
cess of its action depends on the interaction with the private sector and
civil society.v Encouraging the partnership process among them improves
the quality of provision of services, increases social accountability and
ensures vigorous civil participation in the decision-making (UNDP,
2003). How successful the government is in achieving economic devel-
opment depends on historical variables that are not under its direct con-
trol, such as for example the ethnic heterogeneity of the population, the
origin of the legal system of the country and the confessional composi-
tion of the population (La Porta et all., 1999). 
Governance can be measured reliably with great difficulty. In
spite of this, the number of databases is ever greater. These are mainly
indicators that are based on subjective perceptions of commercial agen-
cies for risk rating (BERI, PRS), non-governmental associations
(Freedom House, Heritage Foundation, World Economic Forum,
Transparency International) and multilateral organisations such as the
WB, the EBRD, and the UNDP. These indicators are only estimates
and for this reason they need to be used circumspectly. They show the
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relative position of some country quite well, but do not describe very
precisely the trends for a given country. The problems are that the indi-
vidual indicators overlap, that Croatia does not figure in many of the
sources, and that there is no methodological harmonisation in the dif-
ferent sources. Regular or annual research hardly exists at all, and the
transitional countries have only been included in it since the mid-1990s.
In this work governance indicators are used so that an outline impres-
sion might be gathered of the position of Croatia relative to the EU and
to the candidate countries. So as to enhance the credibility, an endeav-
our is made to back up all the findings with the European Commission
Report on Croatia.
CONDITIONS FOR THE ACCESSION TO
THE EUROPEAN UNION
The Copenhagen criteria for full membership in the EU stipu-
late: (1) stability of the institutions that provide for democracy, rule of
law and order, respect for human and minority rights; and (2) ability to
take on the obligations that are entailed by membership. From the point
of view of this paper these two criteria are the fundamental conditions
for the accession of new members. In the sequel it is explained how
governance and public administration fit in, and then the assistance pro-
vided by the EU to Croatia in meeting the membership criteria is
described. 
Governance
There is no single document that states what the governance of
future member states should be like. However, the EU constantly lays
stress upon the importance of democracy and the rule of law (the first
Copenhagen criteria) and these are also elements for the evaluation of
the quality of governance. To strengthen these, the EU proposes the fol-
lowing principles:
• openness in communications with the public, and transparency;
• more vigorous involvement of the public in the running of policies;
• increased accountability of those in charge of policies;
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• effectiveness in the execution of policies;
• harmonisation of all measures of policies and levels of government so
as to achieve consistency.vi
The first four are also the most frequently mentioned principles
of good governance.
It is important to mention that the EU can act as initiator of
improvement of the quality of governance, but it too is not immune to
weakness in governance. In the EU countries too, and not just in the
transition countries, there is an increasing lack of public trust in institu-
tions and unwillingness to be involved in politics (Commission of the
European Communities, 2001:3). For this reason the objective of the
EU is to make policy making as open as possible in both present and
future member states. There is a wish to give ever greater roles to the
organisations of civil society so that the services provided should be to
the maximum adapted to the needs of citizens. The picture of civil soci-
ety should not be too rosy, because it too can contribute to poor gover-
nance quality, but this, because of the extensiveness of the topic, is not
the subject of this paper.
Public administration 
Entry into the EU puts great pressure on the public administra-
tion. How well some country can function within the EU will depend
on the quality of its civil service. There are no details about the
demands made on future members in terms of this question. This fact is
not surprising, because at EU level there are no clear rules and regula-
tions that are uniformly applied in the public administrations of the
individual countries. What is stressed in negotiations with the future
member states is the need to raise administrative capacities (the supple-
mented second Copenhagen criterion),vii for which the EU provides
assistance. An improvement is required in the capacities of public sec-
tor organisations to perform their tasks effectively in the development
process, keeping to the principles of good governance. Reinforcement
of the public administration (the enhancement of its effectiveness) is
necessary so that the pertinent ministries and other bodies should be
ready to put into effect the various legislative reforms the country has
committed to. Similarly, it is essential for a member country to have
quality representatives in Brussels, who in the endeavour to derive ben-
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efits for their own country have to cope with the competition of repre-
sentatives of other administrations. The improvement of the public
administration (its reform) is in the long-term interest of a future mem-
ber; it should not be understood primarily as pressure from the EU.
Why is the public administration in general so important? This
is because it is the civil service or some other organisations that have to
put into effect the decisions that are made by the policy makers. If
among those who implement the policy there are persons or groups that
have their own agenda, or that consider the implementation of the pol-
icy will injure them, then the whole procedure of political change or
implementation will be impeded. In the process of the application of the
policy, the meaning of it can be changed to such an extent that the final
result will be different from what was expected. The same thing will
happen if corruption is widespread in the public administration or if the
personnel are incompetent. In such cases senior and junior members of
the civil service privatise the use of the instruments of policy for their
own benefit (Tanzi, 1997:6). Put simply, the public administration can
place constraints on the effectiveness of governmental intervention; it
can greatly cooperate in the work of development, but can also be an
enormous hindrance.
European Union assistance to Croatia
The EU assists Croatia via the CARDS programme to meet its
obligations according to the SAA. The priorities of the programme are:
• democratic stabilisation;
• economic and social development;
• justice and home affairs;
• reform of the public administration;
• conservation of the environment and natural resources (MEI, 2003a).
From the point of view of this paper, the first, third and fourth ele-
ments of the programme are particularly interesting, looked at not only
from the viewpoint of harmonisation with EU standards but also, partly
at least, with the objective of seeing the possibility for achieving the sec-
ond priority stated: sustainable economic and social development.viii
In CARDS documents democratic stabilisation is concentrated
on civil society and on promoting democracy and political rights. In the
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domain of the judiciary, the objective of CARDS is the modernisation
of the courts, that is, support to the more effective work and function-
ing of the Croatian judiciary.
As for the public administrations of the countries in the SAA,
the European Commission has clearly identified the reform of them as
one of the priority areas to which resources from the CARDS assistance
programme will be directed. For the 2001-2004 period, 23 million
euros have been earmarked for assistance to the reform of the public
administration in Croatia, which includes assistance to reform of the
civil service, enhancing administrative capacity in SAA priority
regions, and enhancing competence at lower levels of government, as
well as measures for the fight against corruption (MEI, 2003b). The
basic objects of the public administration reform project are:
• improving the legislative framework regulating the work of the pub-
lic administration, the aim being to achieve as great transparency in
hiring, promotion and the salaries system as possible;
• enhancing the institutional capacities of the Ministry of Justice,
Administration and Local Self-Government and other institutions cru-
cial for the management of the public administration; and
• professional further training of civil servants.ix
GOVERNANCE AND PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION IN CROATIA
In this part of the paper the quality of governance is analysed via
indicators that evaluate the rule of law, the development of democracy,
corruption, political stability and the effectiveness of the government.
Why have precisely these indicators been selected? The presence of
rule of law and democracy derives from the Copenhagen criteria.
Corruption indicates the level of transparency (an EU principle of good
governance), and also is an essential element in the evaluation of the
quality of the public administration. Political stability is a precondition
for effectiveness and consistency in the execution of policy (also a prin-
ciple of the EU). The indicator of state effectiveness is included
because it contains elements that are particular for the evaluation of the
work of the public administration. In an analysis of the public adminis-
tration the emphasis is placed on the vulnerable spots, because Croatia
is faced with the reform of the public administration (which is urged by
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the European Commission). For this reason, in the next chapter, the
experience of selected countries in the reform of the public administra-
tion is briefly described.
Rule of Law
The SAA clearly emphasises the importance of the consolida-
tion of the rule of law. It is necessary for the full functioning of the mar-
ket economy (creating an environment that stimulates economic devel-
opment) and for limiting the arbitrary and opportunistic actions of those
in charge of the policy. In the European Commission Report on Croatia
(MEI, 2003c:5) the functioning of the judiciary and the inadequate
implementation of the law are mentioned as serious problems. In
November 2002 the Government adopted its Green Paper on the reform
of the justice system, and at the same time augmented the national
budget for 2003 in order to be able to carry out this reform. However,
the 1,300,000-strong backlog of civil causes is still there. According to
the report of the Commission, the Croatian judiciary is short on person-
nel with appropriate qualifications, an appropriate system for profes-
sional training, and a proper distribution of judicial and administrative
matters in the courts. Judges spend almost a quarter of their time on
administrative matters. Even the European Court of Human Rights has
censured Croatia for the dilatoriness of the justice system. All this is
aggravated by the fact that the Justice Ministry cannot absorb the assis-
tance provided within the CARDS programme context to solve the fail-
ures noted. In order to acquire an insight into the relative position of
Croatia vis-à-vis the EU and the candidate countries, in the sequel the
indicators for the “protection of property rights” and aggregate indica-
tors for the “rule of law” will be used.
The Heritage Foundation has set up an index of economic free-
dom, a component part and indicator of which is “property rights”. It
starts out from the assumption that individuals who consider their prop-
erty rights protected will be more prepared to save, to invest, to make
long-term plans and hence contribute to economic growth. The indica-
tor evaluates the degree of protection of private rights of ownership,
implementation of the laws that protect these rights, the independence
of the judiciary and corruption within the judiciary. The protection of
property rights inside Croatia is considered poor, very distant indeed
from the European average, worse than in all the candidate countries
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(Table 1). The grading of 4 for Croatia means the following: protection
of private property is poor, the courts are inefficient and subject to
political influence, corruption is widespread, and there is also the pos-
sibility of expropriation. Of the countries observed, only Romania has
poorer results, and among the EU countries, Greece sticks out.
Table 1 Protection of rights of property
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Greece 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0
Portugal 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Spain 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
EU average 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4 1.4
Bulgaria 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Estonia 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Czech Republic 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Croatia 3.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Latvia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Lithuania 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Hungary 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Poland 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0
Romania 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0 4.0
Slovakia 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0 3.0
Slovenia 4.0 3.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 2.0 3.0 3.0
*Values range from 1 to 5, 1 being the best. 
Source: Heritage Foundation (2003) 
The aggregate indicator “rule of law” evaluates the extent to
which the rules of society are respected, and it includes a perception
about the incidence of crime, the effectiveness of the courts and the
enforceability of contracts. From Graph 1 it can be seen quite clearly to
what an extent Croatia lags behind the EU, even if it is in front of
Bulgaria and Romania.x
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Graph 1 The rule of law
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Democracy
The general evaluation of the European Commission for Croatia is
that democratic institutions work well and that human rights and basic lib-
erties are in general respected (MEI, 2003c:6). In the sequel there is a
review of indicators that give an insight into how much respect there is for
the principles of openness, civil participation in the running of policies,
transparency and accountability. Graph 2 contains indicators that aggre-
gate political rights, civil liberties and freedom of the media – essential
elements for controlling those who are in power and holding them
accountable for their procedures.xii Croatia has made significant advances
in this area in the last few years, but is still significantly behind the EU.
Graph 2 Civil participation in the process of policy making
Source: Kaufmann [et all.] (2003:89-91)
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Freedom House evaluates these control mechanisms individual-
ly. The political rights indicator assesses the ability of citizens to take a
free part in the political process, and the indicator “civil liberty”
includes freedoms of thought, expression, association and human
rights, and the rule of law. Table 2 shows that Croatia is categorised as
a “free” country, although as compared with EU countries and the can-
didate countries it lags where political rights are concerned. However,
here too an advance can be seen as compared with the 1993 to 2000
period, in which the country was classified as “partly free”. In the group
of less developed EU countries, Greece again stands out with a level of
civil liberties below the EU average. 
In order to obtain a distinct insight into the state of Croatian
media, the indicator media freedom is used. The criteria for the forma-
tion of this indicator are: the legal environment in which the media
work, the degree to which media are independent of state ownership
and influence, economic pressure on the contents of news and various
limitations on press freedom. Table 3 shows that in 2002 the Croatian
media were characterised as partially free, but again this was a consid-
erable advance as against 1994. Among the candidate countries,
Estonia, Poland and Slovenia are closest to the EU average.
Table 3 Media freedom
Country 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Greece 30 26 29 27 30 30 30 30 30
Portugal 18 16 17 17 17 17 17 17 15
Spain 14 23 17 19 17 21 18 20 17
EU average 16.5 17.6 17.6 16.5 16.7 17 16.7 16.3 16.3
Bulgaria 43 39 46 44 36 39 30 26 29
Czech Republic 20 21 19 19 19 20 20 24 25
Estonia 28 25 24 22 20 20 20 20 18
Croatia 56 56 58 63 63 63 63 50 33
Latvia 29 29 21 21 21 21 24 24 19
Lithuania 30 29 25 20 17 18 20 20 19
Hungary 30 38 34 31 28 28 30 28 23
Poland 30 29 21 27 25 25 19 19 18
Romania 55 50 49 47 39 44 44 44 35
Slovakia 47 55 41 49 47 30 30 26 22
Slovenia 40 37 27 28 27 27 27 21 20
* 0-30 = free, 31-60 = partly free, 61-100 = not free
Source: Freedom House (2003b)
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At the beginning of 2003 the European Commission emphasised
that in Croatia a reform of the Media Law was important for progress
in the area of freedom of speech. This refers primarily to forestalling
political meddling and to increasing transparency, in the sense that
information in the possession of governmental bodies has to be acces-
sible to the press, unless it is state secrets that are concerned. The new
Media Law was passed in the middle of October 2003 (NN 163/03),
and the Right of Access to Information Law is in preparation.xiii
Corruption 
Although in the 1960s corruption was held to be a potential con-
tributor to economic development, today the idea that it holds develop-
ment back prevails.xiv The dangers from widespread corruption are par-
ticularly great in countries in which the state has a major role in the
economy (accounts for a high proportion of GDP) and in countries
which do not have a long tradition of good public administration. This
can best be seen in the example of the transition countries where some
research has shown that corruption there is considered the second most
important barrier to the work of investors (Brunetti et all., 1997: 24).xv
The Transparency International Index (CPI) ranks countries
according to the degree of the perception about the spread of corruption
among members of the civil service. Data for Croatia are available only
for the 1990-2003 period; the results got better up to 2001, and after
that declined (Table 4). In 2003 the perception about corruption was
twice as high as in the EU, and about at the level of the candidate coun-
tries, except for Slovenia, Hungary, Lithuania and Estonia. Romania
had the highest perception of corruption. It is interesting that up to 2002
the corruption perception was rising in the Czech Republic as in
Greece; and then, in 2003, both countries experienced a slight improve-
ment. Poland is the only country with a constant rise in the perception
of corruption. Greece and Italy (CPI in 2003 was 5.3) best show that
membership of the EU in no way eliminates the problem of corruption.
The European Commission Croatia Report (MEI, 2003c:5-6)
concluded that opening shots had been fired in the fight against corrup-
tion, which comprehended all parts of the administration, but it was
necessary to reinforce concrete measures for its suppression. The
Parliament adopted a Programme for the Suppression of Corruption and
a Law for the Office for the Suppression of Corruption and Organised
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Crime (commonly known by its abbreviations as USKOK)xvi and rati-
fied the Criminal Law Convention of the Council of Europe. Although
the USKOK Law is harmonised with international standards, the prob-
lems of its enforcement remain. Personnel problems have not been
entirely settled, there is a shortage of funds and equipment, and there
are not separate prosecutors for corruption cases. The effectiveness of
USKOK has been in general low. The national programme of the
Republic of Croatia for the accession to the EU (Vlada RH, 2002)
stressed the role of the Obligations and Rights of Government Officials
Law (NN 101/98) in anti-corruption activities, because it defines the
matter of private and business conflicts of interests. And then in
October 2003 the Prevention of Conflicts of Interests in the
Performance of Public Office Law was passed (NN 163/03). The oppo-
sition vainly resisted a government amendment according to which an
official does not have to transfer management rights in a firm if he or
she has fewer than 25% of the shares or equity in the firm. Graph 3
shows that control of corruption in Croatia is much lower than in the
EU, but that things are getting better, at least with respect to catching
up with the CE5 countries.
Table 4 Corruption Perception Index 
Country 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Greece 5.0 5.3 4.9 4.9 4.9 4.2 4.2 4.3
Portugal 6.5 7.0 6.5 6.7 6.4 6.3 6.3 6.6
Spain 4.3 5.9 6.1 6.6 7.0 7.0 7.1 6.9
EU average 7.3 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.6 7.5 7.6 7.7
Bulgaria … … 2.9 3.3 3.5 3.9 4.0 3.9
Czech Republic 5.4 5.2 4.8 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.7 3.9
Estonia … … 5.7 5.7 5.7 5.6 5.6 5.5
Croatia … … … 2.7 3.7 3.9 3.8 3.7
Latvia … … 2.7 3.4 3.4 3.4 3.7 3.8
Lithuania … … … 3.8 4.1 4.8 4.8 4.7
Hungary 4.9 5.1 5.0 5.2 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.8
Poland 5.6 5.1 4.6 4.2 4.1 4.1 4.0 3.6
Romania … 3.4 3.0 3.3 2.9 2.8 2.6 2.8
Slovakia … … 3.9 3.7 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.7
Slovenia … … … 6.0 5.5 5.2 6.0 5.9
*CPI (Corruption Perception Index) defines corruption as the use of state position for
private use; it ranges from 0 to 10, with 10 meaning the absence of corruption.
Source: Transparency International (2003)
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Graph 3 Control of corruption
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When recruitment into the civil service depends on political con-
nections, there is an increased danger of corruption, because the offi-
cials have a smaller incentive to stay clean. In this case it is essential to
know “whom they serve” and not how successful they are in the per-
formance of their work (Kaufman et all., 2002:4). Accordingly, merito-
cratic recruitment contributes to the suppression of corruption. This
should be borne in mind in the case of Croatia because research has
shown that political influence in recruitment to the civil service is
greater in Croatia than in the CE countries, and even than in Bulgaria
and Romania (Hellman et all., 2000). This was particularly expressed
in the early 1990s, when political criteria were crucial not only for hir-
ing but also for promotion (Kopriæ, 2002:1288).
Pay rises in the civil service might reduce corruption, but to a
limited extent. The first line of defence has to be internal control togeth-
er with the existence of an ethical code (Tanzi, 1998:575). Of course, if
leading officials do not set an example with their own behaviour, those
employed in the civil service can hardly be expected to behave differ-
ently. Corruption is not a crime of passion, but a calculated act, the con-
sequence of the conditions that have created the possibility for it to
come into being. Incorrupt civil servants and citizens are not obtained
by genetic engineering, by the much-touted change in mentality, but by
the different definition of incentives within the system in which they
work.
Political stability
The political stability indicator is used by Kaufmann et all.
(2003) to evaluate perceptions about the likelihood of destabilisation or
the overthrow of the government in some unconstitutional or violent
way. Changes in government can have a direct influence on political
continuity, but in the same way can reduce the chance of citizens peace-
fully electing and changing those in power. Political instability has a
negative effect on economic growth because it increases the risk of
investment. Graph 4 shows that political stability in Croatia is lower
than in the EU, but that the gap is not all that great in comparison with
other elements of governance.
Political stability can be looked at via the fragmentation of the
political scene as well, the clarity with which the political parties are
profiled. From this point of view political stability in Croatia is quite
small, and hence it is essential that there should be administrative sta-
bility, so that frequent changes of officials in power should not have too
much effect on political continuity.
Graph 4 Political stability
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The state of affairs in the civil service 
The objective of this paper is not to give a comprehensive analy-
sis of the Croatian public administration because this would exceed the
constraints of the study. Instead of this, a short comparison with other
countries is offered and the points of vulnerability of the Croatian pub-
lic administration are identified.
The following can be stated as being within the purview of the
Croatian public administration or civil service: direct enforcement of
the law, carrying out administrative and inspection control and other
administrative and professional matters (Vlada RH, 2002). The bodies
of the public administration comprise the ministries, civil service
organisations and county offices as well as the city offices of Zagreb.
In these bodies, officials of the public administration and other employ-
ees attend to the matters of public administration. The officials carry
out the matters from the statutorily defined jurisdiction of the body in
which they work, and other employees carry out ancillary and other
matters. The situation in the public administration at a local level
requires a separate analysis and hence is not the subject of this paper. 
Comparison with other European countries 
The degree of success of the public administration can be
defined in numerous ways, but there is no single indicator to quantify it
and thus make possible a comparison among different countries. If we
were to review it only from the aspect of economic growth, then data
about the corruption of officials and efficiency in dealing with investors
(number of regulations, time needed to set up a firm, costs of new
starts)xvii would all be important. In this paper, however, the public
administration is largely considered with the aim of improving its
capacities to carry out its tasks within the EU effectively and hence a
description of it is made with broad strokes.
The given governance indicators cover the perception of the
work of the public administration. The problem here is that there is no
conceptual distinction made among the terms: government, state,
bureaucracy and public administration, the result being that the indica-
tors are fairly confused. Thus, for example, the indicator “effectiveness
of government” combines perceptions about the quality of the provision
of public services, the quality of the bureaucracy, the competence of
civil servants, the independence of the civil service from political pres-
sures and the credibility of the state in carrying out its policies
(Kaufmann et all., 2003:3). In Graph 3 the big gap between the coun-
tries of CE Europe and the EU can be seen; Croatia itself is in a slight-
ly better position than Bulgaria and Romania, with the provision that
progress over the years has been little and even negative.
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Graph 5 Government effectiveness
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The commercial agency Political Risk Services Group formu-
lated an indicator called “quality of bureaucracy” that assesses the
expertise and competence of governance without drastic changes in
policy, independence of political pressure and the existence of a regu-
lar mechanism for hiring and further training (PRS, 2003). According
to this indicator, Croatia is ranked fairly high vis-à-vis the EU, but has
to be taken with a deal of caution because these are monthly data
involved (Graph 6), and it is at odds with the results of the earlier men-
tioned research about recruitment in terms of political acceptability.
Graph 6 Quality of bureaucracy
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Vulnerability of the Croatian public
administration
Modern societies assume a public administration that is profes-
sional, socially accountable, independent from political influences,
open to the public and effective. The Croatian public administration is
not perceived as such. “Citizens consider the administration distant,
formal and corrupted, the media subject it to constant criticism. It is not
perceived as professional and unbiased, but riddled with connections
and the exchange of friendly services. It is expensive. The people in the
administration do not get there because of professional criteria and are
not promoted according to expertise and performance” (Ured za strate-
giju razvitka RH, 2001:7). According to public opinion research
(IDEA, 2003), the biggest problems that Croatia is faced with are:
unemployment, corruption and poverty. Crime and the legal system
occupy the 4th and 5th positions while an inadequate public administra-
tion is only in 13th place out of 20.xviii
The qualification structure of civil servants is improving, but it
is still unsatisfactory. About 33% of the employees have degree-level
qualifications, 15% some tertiary qualification, 49% secondary qualifi-
cations, and about 3% are unqualified (Vlada RH, 2002). Still, it is pos-
sible that the kind of knowledge obtained in tertiary level institutions is
a greater problem than the qualification structure. The system for pro-
motion is both automatic and free, but there is mainly automatic pro-
motion, which lessens individual responsibility.
As in most countries, in Croatia people with university degrees
are paid less in the administration than in the private sector (Baðun and
Obadiæ, 2003:18), which reduces motivation and increases the likeli-
hood that the most competent will depart. Although lower wages are
partially compensated for with lower stress than that experienced by
managers in the private sector, there is a shortage of additional motives
to keep educated young people in the public administration.
According to the law, during their employment officials are
bound to undergo further professional training, the organisation of
which is in the jurisdiction of each body of government. The institu-
tional framework has thus been established, but the problem is that this
did not happen at the beginning of the 1990s and that the implementa-
tion of it has not been adequately coordinated among the bodies of the
civil service, among which communications are in general not devel-
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oped enough. It would seem that the Ministry for European Integration
(MEI) has put much more into the training of employees than the other
ministries, but it is worrying that it also has the greatest turnover of
employees.xix After they have obtained training and experience, young
people move to the private sector. The problem of human potentials
will be still greater because it is realistic to expect that the best will
leave for Brussels, leaving the Croatian public administration with per-
sonnel that are not qualified enough.
The basic regulation governing the rights, obligations, responsi-
bilities and pay scales in the civil service is the Government Officials
and Other Employees Law (NN 27/01).xx The EU did not implicitly
require the introduction of this Law. The law contains the system for
evaluating officials according to the criteria established by the minister
in whose jurisdiction lie matters of the general administration. The rat-
ing comes annually and is entered into the “personal record”, grades
ranging from unsatisfactory to particularly successful. However, it is
somewhat absurd to see that in the law one of the “minor infringe-
ments” is “unjustified absence from work of one day” while on the
other side little attention is paid to ethics. Similarly, the law says that
job vacancies must be advertised in the Croatian Official Gazzette and
perhaps in a daily or weekly paper. Usually these invitations are open
for a very short time and they are seen by a very small number of peo-
ple, which increases the likelihood of lack of transparency and negative
selection.xxi This only feeds the high degree to which the Croatian pub-
lic administration is politicised.
The Ministry of Justice, Administration and Local Self-
Government is institutionally responsible for control of the enforce-
ment of the regulations governing the organisation and jurisdiction of
the bodies of the government administration, but the impression is
given that there is not any adequately developed culture for surveillance
and assessment of the public administration at all levels.
As for organisation, there is clearly too large a number of min-
istries (19) and there is some overlapping of responsibilities. Merging
and reviewing of the functions of some of the bodies of the public
administration are necessary.
It can be expected that there will be a necessary rise in the share
of budget spending for the public administration infrastructure, because
of the new obligations related to membership. In the last few years this
happened in Estonia, Latvia and Czech Republic, even in Sweden and
Finland before accession. When this is put into the context of the per-
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sistent claims that it is necessary to cut government spending, it is clear
there will be problems.
One of the main points of vulnerability is the lack of appropri-
ate organisation culture in the public administration and of certain val-
ues that ought to be interwoven with it. It is very difficult to break up
the inheritance of clientelism and paternalism in which the administra-
tion has been focussed too much only upon itself. A culture of secrecy
has been cultivated, favouring nepotism and arbitrariness, and citizens
have always been made to feel subordinate in their encounters with the
administration. It is disturbing that even today among the citizens res-
ignation and scepticism prevail to do with any kind of reform relating
to the government.
REFORM OF THE PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION 
In the European Commission’s Second Annual Report about the
SAA for 2003, it is stressed that “Croatia ought to pay particular atten-
tion to the strengthening of the public administration so that the appro-
priate ministries and other public bodies should acquire the position for
the correct implementation of the many legislative reforms that Croatia
has obligated itself to” (MEI, 2003c). It is also stated that the
Government is probably incapable of pushing through reform of the
administration since it is largely occupied with internal dissensions. 
Although the Government is aware of the importance of reform,
there is no clear short-term plan for its implementation, and there is no
strong political will. Two years have elapsed since the “Public
Administration” proposal in the Croatia in the 21st Century project, and
the Government has still not adopted it. The emphasis is on the raising
of the effectiveness of the system, effectiveness being taken to mean
social accountability to the citizens (Ured za strategiju razvitka RH,
2001). In the agenda of the government for the 2000-2004 period, spe-
cial attention was devoted to the administration: halting expansion,xxii
horizontal decentralisation, increased rationality and efficiency (avoid-
ing overlapping), and attaining qualifications for the process of har-
monisation with the EU (Vlada RH, 2000). The sequel describes the
experience of selected European countries in the reform of the public
administration.xxiii
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European Union countries 
The actual bureaucratic machinery in Brussels itself is not some-
thing to aim at, irrespective of the quality of the individuals that work
there. For this reason it is better to look at individual EU countries.
Since the 1980s, public administration trends in EU countries have
been towards:
• opening up to the public;
• promotion according to additional criteria, not just seniority;
• transfer of some responsibilities to the public sector;
• decentralisation;
• introduction of financial motivation to the system (fees of different
amounts according to how long the procedure lasts).
Each country has a specific public administration, and we shall
mention here only the examples of the UK, Sweden, France and
Germany, which are known for their good administrations, and of Spain
before the accession.
The example of the UK best shows that even a 150 year long tra-
dition of public administration does not guarantee immunity to reforms,
because they go on all the time. The change of government in 1997 was
a vivid illustration of the way this civil service works. In 24 hours, the
ministerial changeover was effected, but those who had previously
advised the Conservative government were still doing the same for the
Labour government (Behrens, 2002). This shows that there is a fair
amount of separation between politicians and civil service in Britain.
The prestige of this public administration is derived from its profession-
alism, and not from the law about it, while its success is derived also
from the powerful civil society that is actively involved in an assess-
ment of its work.
In spite of the civil service in Sweden having a long history of
experience in international cooperation, joining the EU was a dramatic
change for it (Lindgren, 2002). The basic action of the Swedes on this
occasion was to make their civil service every bit as professional as
those in other member countries in order to achieve the maximum of
benefit for their own country within the EU. On accession, the obliga-
tions were 50% greater, and the resources considerably smaller. A spe-
cific feature of Sweden is the small size of ministries, since there are
semi-independent agencies for the implementation of policy in which
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the largest number of civil servants are employed. Since 1994 (the year
before accession) the Forum Europe has been at work; this is a body
within the government charged with the professional further training of
civil servants.
After World War II, France realised the need for a new and dif-
ferent public administration. Leading French statesmen realised that a
job in the civil service required specific kinds of knowledge, and for
this reason in 1945 the Ecole nationale d’administration (ENA) was set
up – an educational institute run and controlled by the government
(Šimac, 2002:50-60). Today ENA is one of the leading tertiary level
educations concerning public administration in the world. Education at
ENA lasts about two and a half years and consists of a study part and
one year’s practical work.xxiv There is an entrance procedure to get into
ENA, for which every year from 10 to 20 candidates apply for every
place.xxv All the candidates accepted automatically enter the civil serv-
ice and obtain a corresponding salary (ca 8,000 francs a month). During
their practical work and study the candidates are constantly being eval-
uated, and the order is regularly published. This order is essential for
their future career, for those at the top of the list have the right to choose
the job that the administration is currently offering. It is interesting that
President Chirac is himself a former student of  ENA. It is criticised for
having become a school of the “snappy and self-satisfied Parisian bour-
geoisie” because the share of candidates from well-to-do families
comes to about 65% (Šimac, 2003:61). Apart from that, the need for in-
service training of civil servants is neglected.
The institutionalisation of the administration in Germany goes
back to 1794 and the Prussian “general law” (Derlien, 2003). It can be
said that in Germany the civil service preceded democracy, which had
a permanent effect on the separation of politicians from civil servants.
In spite of some changes, it can be said that the public administration in
Germany is still founded on Weber’s principles of bureaucracy.xxvi It is
marked by high professionalism, strict organisational hierarchy,
employment according to merit, promotion by objective criteria of pro-
fessionalism, neutrality in the provision of public services, and securi-
ty of employment. The German specific feature is that all improve-
ments in the public administration have been generated within the serv-
ice, not as a result of political pressure.
From the beginning of the 20th century, Spain endeavoured to
adjust the always insufficiently flexible structure of its public adminis-
tration to the rapid and sometimes radical changes in its society. In
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1984 (two years before accession) a law concerning the reform of the
administration was passed, but it was subject to sharp criticism from the
public because of the poor technical performance and problems in the
application (Subirats, 1990). In 1986 the Ministry for Public
Administration was set up, and in 1987 the law concerning the public
service was passed. The basic aim was to change the administration
from being that which “regulated life” to one that was subordinate to
results and serving the public. A great gap was felt between the tasks to
be done and the old methods of management used in the public admin-
istration. Particular attention was devoted to human resources – to
attracting and retaining qualified personnel; an inspectorate for the
services of the public administration was set up, its purpose being to
improve its work through constant assessments and evaluation. The
main barriers to reform were: (1) the impression among the civil ser-
vants that this was “just another reform”; (2) resistance of the unions;
(3) departure of highly ranked officials for the private sector; (4) short-
age of NGOs to demand changes in the public sector; and (5) political
instability. The situation with reform of the Spanish administration
before accession recalls that in Croatia.
From the example of these countries it can be seen that the
process of reform and modernisation of the public administration is an
ongoing one, and that it is never simple, even in highly developed coun-
tries. Still, however much reform of the administration might seem
imperfect, painful and expensive, it is not less ruthless than the meth-
ods used in market competition (Pusiæ, 1999:241).
The candidate countries 
In earlier years of the transition of the countries of CEE, the
basic method for reform of the public administration was to cut the
number of employees and cut wages to achieve fiscal savings (UNDP,
2001:1), without paying much attention to the consequences in terms of
quality. Looking at the results of public administration reforms in these
countries, it can be said they are not totally satisfactory, but that some
kind of general progress has been made. At the beginning of the 90’s,
these countries were suddenly in the situation of having too few and too
many civil servants. On the one hand they were hampered by the com-
munist heritage of the bureaucratic machinery, and on the other the
need for the development of a modern administration had arisen.
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This kind of civil service needed to be different from the inherited
structure in that it was freed from external influences – political parties,
business and regional lobbies, and had a transparent hiring system.
The basic problems of the public administrations of the transi-
tion countries are the following:
• the legislative framework is centred too much on details and has
retained the bad structure of promotion based mainly on years of work
experience;
• not enough attention is devoted to ethics;
• it is not clear who is charged with surveillance of the public adminis-
tration;
• pay policy is such that many employees went off into the private sec-
tor; in Estonia and Czech Republic, for example, highly positioned
managers earn 6 to 10 times the amount in the private sector than in
the civil service (Nunberg, 2000:13);
• there is not a precise enough recruitment system;
• the countries do not have an education system to apply to the whole
of the public administration, and not only to the part of it that is in
charge the most for European integration.
According to research into the opinions of civil servants and
politicians in Estonia, Lithuania, Poland and the Czech Republic, the
first step in the reform should have been depoliticisation – the separa-
tion of the administration from politics (King et all., 2002).
Poland adopted a public administration law back in 1997,
according to which some of the places in the public administration were
defined as the civil service. For the transition, certain qualifications and
examinations were required. The new version of the law was adopted
in 1998 (after the change of government), and it has to be said that on
paper it looks good because it contains the elements that should lead to
improvements in the work of civil servants (O’Dwyer, 2002:29).
However, from the time the second law was passed, only 560 of the
110,000 employees employed in the public administration met the con-
ditions to be part of the civil service. The rest are part of the newly
formed “state body”, which is nothing but a change of name and a leav-
ing of the opportunity for protection in employment and promotion.
Most do not want to go to the civil service, because the advantages are
slight and the dangers unknown. Alongside this law, in 1991 Poland
formed the National School of the Public Administration.xxvii At the
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beginning it excited great interest and enthusiasm but in time it lost its
character and its influence was minimal. Too few people graduated
from it for them to be able to bring about any changes, only 400 of them
in 10 years. In addition, the ability to get employed in the public admin-
istration depended on various politicians. The biggest problem was the
inimical attitude of the remainder of the service, which perceived them as
a threat, as outsiders who belonged nowhere. The example of Poland best
shows that laws are not enough if political pressures are not eliminated.
In Slovakia the law on the civil service was adopted in 2001, but
from talks with those employed in the public administration the opin-
ion emerges that this law was only a formality necessary for satisfying
EU requirements. That is, the law only fixed the existing positions of
those employed in the public administration and institutionalised pro-
tectionism (O’Dwyer, 2002:31).
In the Czech Republic the many necessary steps have not been
taken, but at least the situation has not deteriorated because of badly
implemented reforms. The law on the civil service is about to be
passed; they are thinking about setting up an Institute for public admin-
istration and local self-governmentxxviii and an ethical code is being
worked out (EPF, 2002). Nevertheless, there are still regular complaints
from the European Commission about the public administration in the
Czech Republic.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The comparison of the quality of governance in Croatia, the EU
and in selected candidate countries shows, unfortunately, that gover-
nance constitutes a considerable barrier in the accession of Croatia to
the EU, as well as to the achievement of economic and social develop-
ment. In terms of all the selected governance indicators, Croatia lags
behind the average of the EU and the CE5 countries; this is particular-
ly prominent in the area of rule of law. However, what is positive is that
all the indicators have been slowly improving in the last few years; the
only suspect element of governance in this point of view is government
effectiveness. This just shows that it is necessary to fix one’s gaze on
the public administration as one of the potentially weakest links in the
institutional development of the country. A poor public administration
in combination with a low level of rule of law is probably one of the
greatest hurdles in the way of European integration. If certain rules and
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standards that will encourage civil servants of whatever rank to achieve
the general aims and limit them in their arbitrary actions do not exist,
they will become increasingly opportunistic. Without the rule of law,
primarily of an effective judiciary, it is impossible to exercise surveil-
lance over those in charge of policy, there is no legal framework neces-
sary for the development of civil society, and a setting is created that
does not promote economic development.
Public administrations change, because the society changes too.
However, the society always changes faster. The aim is not to create a
given structure for the public administration and then to cement it. The
experience of highly developed countries with good civil services shows
that reforms are going on all the time. Reform of the public administra-
tion cannot be separated from reform of the government, its role and
function. There is bound to be resistance from threatened interest groups,
but it is possible to handle it with good public support for the reforms.
Recommendations
• Strengthening the rule of law. On this depends the success of all other
reforms. It is necessary to put into action the recently adopted judicial
reform strategy with the assistance of a concrete action plan and to
reduce the number of backlogged cases; to carry out a problem for
training the judges and prosecutors and other court personnel.
• Depoliticisation of the public administration. The first move in the
reform of the public administration should be to depoliticise it, which
is achieved by recruitment according to merit (education and checks
of knowledge) and not political connections. One of the solutions for
the depoliticisation is to found an independent agency charged with
recruitment in the public administration and in general the manage-
ment of human resources. An alternative is to found a body within the
Government that would be charged with this task, with the provision
of the possibility of court appeals against decisions related to hiring.
Beside this the foundation of an institute for the training of state offi-
cials should be considered.
• Opening up towards the public. Like a person of good reputation, the
government should not hide anything. Vigorous involvement of mem-
bers of the public in the work of the public administration will be dif-
ficult; it is something that has not been totally mastered anywhere in
the EU. Citizens should be deemed authorised to receive information
about the work of the administration; civil society must develop into
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a powerful control mechanism on the work of the public administra-
tion and be its associate. The increase of transparency necessarily also
requires a greater freedom of the media. This will likely be assisted by
the new Media Law, but there is still no Access to Information Law.
• Increased motivation of civil servants for their work. The motivation
of the employees has a great role in the improvement of the work of
the public administration. It must not happen that the government pre-
tends to pay its workers and they in return pretend to work. If wages
are given that are comparable with those in the private sector for the
same level of responsibility and skills, the best staff will be retained.
Since the budget puts constraints on the desired level of expenditure
for the pay of employees in the pubic administration, additional moti-
vation is required to keep the young and highly educated in the civil
service. The public administration must not be perceived as a spring-
board for a career in the public sector; a job in the civil service should
be a matter of prestige. 
• Additional criteria for promotion in the civil service. Promotion must
not be based only on years of work (which is predominant in Croatia)
but on performance at work, for which constant evaluation of the
employees is required, caution being exercised to make sure this does
not turn into an instrument for the involvement of politics. As addi-
tional stimulus, selective pay rises can be introduced.
• Suppression of corruption. With good incentives, the desire to receive
bribes diminishes. Although the first steps to do with the suppression
of corruption have been taken in Croatia, more vigorous measures
must be taken to step up progress in the area, and it is necessary to
make the results as visible as possible to the public.
• Development of a new culture among civil servants. It is necessary to
set up new values and attitudes among those working in the public
administration - to create a new culture. Civil servants should be more
public-oriented and more interested in results, which can be achieved
with stimuli that are not related to pay, such as public recognition and
awards. It is also necessary to test public opinion about the civil serv-
ices in an ongoing way.
• Education and training. Training must not be directed only at the
MEI, but spread vigorously throughout the whole of the public admin-
istration. People are the key factor in the quality of the public admin-
istration. 
• Higher quality work from officials. The quality of government offi-
cials should be an element complementary to the public administra-
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tion, because after all a civil service can only be as good as the politi-
cians and the objectives they set up. For the quality to improve, pub-
lic pressure is crucial; the public has to insist that the politicians rep-
resent their interests. In addition, they need to be able to have further
training, of the kind that ministers go through in the UK, for example.
If nothing else, an environment of highly qualified assistants can be
created.
• Debureaucratisation. It is possible to contribute to debureaucratisa-
tion by bringing in various prices for the same service, depending on
the speed with which one wants it to be done. It would be good here
if all forms were easily understandable to the members of the public
and if they could carry out some of the formalities of the administra-
tion online.
• Monitoring the quality of governance. So as to be able to have ongo-
ing monitoring of the quality of governance in all countries, including
Croatia, it is necessary to do a lot of work on raising the quality of the
governance indicators. This can be done primarily via in-depth and
systematic research specially adapted to the given country. 
i Although the World Bank set off the avalanche of research on the theme of gover-
nance, it cannot be said that no one had dealt with it earlier. The question of public
administration and governing occupied many political philosophers. Thus for exam-
ple the term politeia, in Plato, is close to the meaning of governance as defined by
the World Bank.
ii For an additional explanation of the term governance, see: Ahrens (2002).
iii Jones (2002) instead of the term governance uses in a similar context the expression
social infrastructure.
iv For the connection between governance and development see: Aron (2000); Basu
(2002); Campos (1999); Dethier (1999); Kaufman and Kray (2002).
v Civil society includes all kinds of voluntary associations – social movements, the
church, unions, professional associations, local communities, charitable associa-
tions, interest groups (Office for the Strategic Development of the Republic of
Croatia, 2001:21.
vi These principles are: openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness, coher-
ence.
vii The European Council in Madrid 1995 stressed the importance of administrative
capacity as criterion for accession to the EU.
viii Article 75 of the SAA (Strengthening Institutions and the Rule of Law) relates to gov-
ernance and public administration: “In cooperation within the sphere of justice and
home affairs, parties shall give special attention to the consolidation of the rule of
law and to the strengthening of institutions at all levels in the general area of admin-
istration, especially in the implementation of justice and in applying judiciary mech-
anisms. Cooperation in the sphere of justice shall focus primarily on the independ-
ence of the judiciary, the improvement of its efficiency, and further education within
the field of law”.
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ix The execution under the leadership of an international consortium began in
November 2002 and is planned to last for 21 months.
x CE5 consists of Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia.
xi In the making of all graphs except for Graph 6, data from Kaufmann et all. (2003)
are used. Since the methodology of aggregating indicators is fairly complex, this
paper can be recommended for more information.
xii It can be stated for certain that democracy has a positive effect on economic
growth, but it is an essential element in social development.
xiii In October 2003, the opposition in parliament was against this law being passed
by the urgent procedure.
xiv Corruption increases transaction costs, and reduces investment.
xv The questions can be asked if the real problem lies in corruption or in the size of
the administrative barriers that breeds corruption.
xvi NN 88/01, Amendments to the Law, NN 12/02.
xvii For more on this see: Baðun and Obadiæ (2003).
xviii According to this research, inadequacy of the public administration can be seen in
its doing its work slowly and incompetently.
xix Since 1998 the Government has given scholarships for post-graduate studies
abroad to get quality civil servants. In addition, MEI is doing a cycle of seminars
called “ABC of Europe”, one of the ways of training civil servants.
xx There is a special category of government officials, i.e., politically appointed civil
servants, whose rights are regulated by a special Law concerning the Obligations
and Rights of government Officials (NN 101/98). The many changes to this law are
published in NN 101/98, 135/98, 105/99, 25/00, 73/00, 131/00, 30/01, 59/01,
114/01, 153/02).
xxi According to sociologist Max Weber (1968) a civil service founded on employment
by merit and lucrative careers for civil servants is one of the fundamental institu-
tional bases for capitalist growth.
xxii An attempt will be made to avoid the foundation of new administrative organisa-
tions and the hiring of new civil servants.
xxiii For more information about the reform of the public administration in general see:
Šimac (2002).
xxiv Course work includes such areas as public law, economics, international relations,
public finance, social policy, governance, EU law, globalisation, demography, and
computer science.
xxv The entrance exam consists of an eliminatory written and then an oral part. The
written exams (checks of knowledge of economics, public law, general culture and
one optional) last 5 hours, and the papers are handed in under conditions of strict
anonymity.
xxvi In this context the word bureaucracy does not have any negative meaning, but
relates to a specific form of the organisation of the public administration.
xxvii Krajowa Szkola Administracji Publicznej.
xxviii The negative side of the founding of such an institute is the creation of a close elite
that is likely to create a monopoly on the making of decisions about the function-
ing of the public administration. If such an institute is located in the capital, then
the marginalisation of the regions can occur too (O’Dwyer, 2002).
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